


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SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

The United Nations' charter gives responsibilities for maintaining peace to the Security Council; but this function has passed by default to the General Assembly and the Office of the Secretary General because of cold-war developments and the Soviet abuse of the veto. As a consequence, the UN's peace-keeping operations have been undertaken on a more or less ad hoc basis, financed in some cases from the regular budget and in others by special assessment. There have been few, if any, common denominators in the UN's various approaches to critical situations.

With the exception of the Korean command--which in reality was a United States operation under a UN umbrella--these peace-keeping operations have, however, had one important characteristic in common: none of the five permanent Security Council members has been allowed to participate in any sizable military way. The resulting dependence on the less powerful "nonaligned" countries has been an added handicap for the UN operations, particularly since many of these countries lack any well-established tradition in the disciplined use of military force.

Middle East

Until the Congo crisis broke, UN peace-keeping activities were centered mainly in the Middle East. There the UN has maintained a Truce Supervision Organ-

ization together with four Mixed Armistice Commissions since 1948 to oversee the truce between Israel and the Arab states. In 1956, following the Suez crisis, a 5,000-man Emergency Force was dispatched to the area for the same purpose to patrol the Gaza strip and the Sinai peninsula.

Two smaller "temporary" operations were undertaken in 1958; namely, the establishment of a "UN presence" in Jordan and a UN Observer Group in Lebanon. Both were set up with a view to preventing a local incident from escalating into regional conflict.

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), a body of neutral observers, has the over-all responsibility for supervising the uneasy Arab-Israeli armistice with the aid of the four Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs). These groups have been beset by many difficulties, chief of which has been Israel's obstructionism and its public campaign to discredit the UN effort. In addition, the Arabs and the Israelis try to outdo each other in the number of complaints submitted.

UN personnel have been able to cope with this kind of friction, but Arab "fedayeen" raids (large-scale, commando-type attacks) and the Israeli Sinai campaign in 1956 have shown conclusively that UNTSO and the MACs cannot prevent large-scale

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warfare whenever this is the intention of either side. There is little question, however, that removal of UNTSO or a drastic reduction of its functions could lead to a resumption of open warfare.

The UN presence in Jordan, sometimes called the Spinelli Mission after the ambassador in charge, was set up by the UN Secretary General in compliance with a General Assembly resolution of 27 September 1958. On paper, the mission's job was to check up on the implementation of a mutual pledge by several Arab states to stop interfering in each other's internal affairs. In practice, however, the mission functioned primarily as a clearinghouse for complaints of subversive activity against Jordan by the United Arab Republic. It was gradually phased out, and finally dissolved in September 1959.

Although the Spinelli Mission was only a show of the UN flag, it probably indicates the kind of machinery Secretary General Thant has in mind for promoting a settlement of the current Yemeni-UAR-Saudi conflict.

In Lebanon, a Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958 authorized the formation of an observer group (UNOGIL in UN parlance) to prevent the infiltration of personnel and arms into Lebanon for subversive purposes. The most significant aspect of this operation was the speed with which the UN was able

to install a military observer group at a point of crisis. The first contingent of UNOGIL was on the premises within eight days, and it reached with relative rapidity a peak strength of 579 officers and men. All had to be from UN members acceptable to the host country. Although it was unable to stop the flow of Syrian arms into Lebanon, UNOGIL's symbolic character probably aided in diminishing local tension and facilitated the withdrawal of American forces.

The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was established by the General Assembly in November 1956 to patrol the Gaza strip and Sinai areas after the withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli invasion troops. The force is still a going concern although seriously hampered by the reluctance of UN members to support it with men and money.

The UNEF was the first UN peace-keeping force to be armed, and it established several other precedents also. The late Secretary General Hammarskjold--in an October 1958 report to the General Assembly on the experience gained by the UN in operating UNEF--recommended that any future UN police force be recruited only on an ad hoc basis after an emergency situation had arisen. In other words, the UN's experience with UNEF convinced Hammarskjold--and many UN members--that it was neither necessary nor feasible to create a permanent UN stand-by peace force.

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Also on this occasion Hammarskjold advanced the principle that forces of this kind ought to be equipped with light arms but not include troops from the five permanent members of the Security Council. He also proposed a number of operational procedures, including the following: 1) UN forces would be sent into a danger area only with the consent of the country involved; 2) a UN force should use its weapons only in self-defense; 3) either the Security Council or the General Assembly would set the framework on how UN forces should be used; and 4) ultimate decisions on field operations would be left to the Secretary General.

South and Southeast Asia

As a consequence of the dispute over Kashmir, a UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established by the Security Council in 1948 to supervise the cease-fire line running through that territory. Staffed primarily by personnel from the US, Britain, and the older Commonwealth countries, this organization has been notably effective in handling numerous potentially explosive incidents.

General R.H. Nimmo of Australia, the officer in command, believes that his group, composed of about 30 men manning a total of 10 observer posts, is adequate under existing circumstances. It is, however, obviously incapable of coping with any large-scale military operations.

The UN has also had a hand in the peaceful settlement of the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute over West New Guinea. The UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)--under the direction of a civilian chief, Dr. Djalal Abdoh of Iran, assisted by some 1,500 Pakistani troops--took over the administration of West New Guinea from the Netherlands on 1 October 1962. On 1 May of this year, the UN will turn over the area to Indonesia under the terms of an agreement negotiated by US Ambassador Bunker, signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands, and endorsed by the UN General Assembly.

The primary purpose of this operation is to maintain a peaceful transition period between the departure of the Dutch administration and the take-over by Indonesian authorities. While many UN members believe that Charter principles regarding self-determination of all peoples were compromised by this virtual gift to Sukarno, nevertheless the UN administration has so far effectively fulfilled its limited mandate.

Africa

The current effort in the Congo (ONUC) is the UN's most ambitious undertaking to date. In many respects, it has also been the most frustrating. Financing the operation has brought the UN to the brink of bankruptcy, and operations frequently have been rendered ineffective because

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of poor coordination between headquarters in New York and forces in the field.

Ever since the force was established in July 1960 by the Security Council, it has received directives--at times in conflict with one another--from the General Assembly and the Secretary General as well as from the council. Local commanders at times took matters into their own hands, as was the case when UN troops took over the key Katangan mining centers of Jadotville and Ki-pushi. Thus, while the ending of the Katangan secession was a success for the UN, the conduct of operations is scarcely a model of efficiency for the future.

UN forces in the Congo, at one point 18,000 strong, are now down to about 12,000. Thant plans to reduce this to about 6,000 by 1 July. His main pre-occupation--now that the military phase seems to be ending--is to pare UN military costs and to round up funds for a massive UN-sponsored economic and technical assistance program.

Financing

There is no uniformity in the way the UN pays the expenses of its peace-keeping operation. The undertakings in Kashmir,

Jordan, and Lebanon were financed out of the regular budget. The costs of the West New Guinea operations are shared by the two countries concerned. UNEF and ONUC get their funds from separate accounts; in UNEF's case this is called a "special account" while in ONUC's it is an "ad hoc account."

The handling of UNEF and ONUC accounts marked an innovation in UN finances in that special cost-sharing arrangements were developed. These arrangements included voluntary contributions from member states--chiefly the United States--and also provided for a formal apportionment of the remaining expenses among all member states. It is these assessments that the Soviet bloc, France, and many of the lesser UN members have either failed or refused to pay. UNEF has, in recent years, been costing the UN about \$20 million per year, ONUC about \$120 million a year.

In 1962 the General Assembly set up a 21-member committee to try to draw up a new scale of assessments for financing peace-keeping operations. The eight less developed countries representing Asia, Africa and Latin America on the committee were "shocked, dismayed, and astounded" when the United States announced that it would pay no more than its regular assessment of 32.02 percent toward any future peace-keeping operations.

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These countries then put forward a new proposal under which costs of such future operations would be borne almost entirely by the "industrialized members." Under this proposal, the first \$5 million would be raised by assessing the entire membership at their present regular percentage. The share of the industrialized members in the next \$95 million would rise on a sharply graduated scale starting with 50 percent and finally reaching 90 percent. On 29 March the committee adjourned without reaching an agreement.

A special session of the General Assembly to discuss finances is scheduled to convene on 14 May. Prospects now seem remote for finding a generally satisfactory formula that is financially workable and which all members will honor. Unless the ticklish problem of financing peace-keeping operations on a more equitable basis is resolved, however, the UN will be in a poor position to mount any but small-scale undertakings. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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